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Abstract— The incipient mind argument is the central 
argument of Evan Thompson’s solution to the so-called mind-
body problem. This paper challenges Evan Thompson’s (and 
Francisco Varela’s) assumption of a pristine form of subjectivity, 
as well as of interiority in unicellular life forms. I claim that this 
assumption makes sense only as a useful strategy for an 
absolutist account of mind. In this paper, I argue that 
Thompson’s thesis is erroneous at the object-level, as well as at 
the meta-level of his argumentation. By paying greater attention 
to the meta-level of his exposition, I show that Thompson’s 
assumption of an “incipient mind” obeys an absolutist, two-sided 
pattern of thinking and, therefore, that his argumentation fails to 
give an accurate account of the systemic generation and 
development of mind. After demonstrating this, I suggest an 
innovative action-based approach to mind in order to accurately 
give an account of its real-constructive development. 
 
Index Terms— enarrativity, historico-genetic theory, emergence 
of mind, process philosophy, processual form of thinking, evolution 
of thought 
 
I. INTRODUCTION HE actual formulation of the mind-body problem is the 
following: How does mind come to be in the natural 
organism? Evan Thompson’s answer to the question of 
generation and development of mind is that there is no 
generation of mind at all. Mind has always been there, namely 
in life. From a naturalistic point of view, one cannot disagree 
with Evan Thompson, when he claims that “there is a deep 
continuity between life and mind” ([1], pp. ix and 222). That 
is because many cognitive theorists share the same general 
goal: to give an account of how the mind arises out of its 
physical and biological conditions, and how the intrinsic 
connections work with its biotic milieu. Correspondingly, the 
shared assumption for this enterprise is that there must be a 
significant continuity between life and mind. There are many 
perspectives from which scientists, physicists and 
philosophers join efforts to explain the development of human 
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mind. The philosophical problem that I want to stress here is 
rather this: which argumentative tool is more suitable for such 
an enterprise? 
The most general and indispensable argumentative tool for 
this philosophical project is the way we think about the 
phenomenon in question. By formulating the problem in this 
manner, I am framing and setting it at the meta-level. There 
are, in fact, two major forms or patterns of thinking which we 
can identify in the enarrative practice of arguing throughout 
human cultural history (cf. [2], pp. 91-151). In this context, 
enarrativity consists in the use of ontogenetically, reflectively 
acquired cognitive structures and relations in an explanative 
fashion [3]. The two patterns of thinking we find in history are 
the linear form of thinking (subsequently abbreviated as LFT) 
and the processual form of thinking (subsequently abbreviated 
as PFT) [3]. Consequently, these are the two alternatives 
available to adopt, in order to give a developmental account of 
human mind. Depending on the general understanding of mind 
adopted, one can then judge the form of thinking employed in 
the argumentation as accurate or not. 
Mind, in its most general understanding, is a complex open 
unity of interactions that emerges from biotic as well as 
cultural conditions. This means that mind is a constructive 
product of a complex concatenation of multivariate processes. 
If this general understanding of mind is correct or, at least 
plausible, a tool able to give an account of mind’s dynamics 
would hold for more appropriate than any other means that 
does not acknowledge the essential characteristics of mind, i.e. 
complexity, constructiveness, and emergence or novelty. In 
accordance with this, PFT seems to be an adequate ennarrative 
tool for reconstructing the development of human mind, as 
well as its relational features because it is able to give an 
account of mind by means of tracing it back to its multivariate 
real conditions. I shall defend the explanatory superiority of 
PFT over LFT by showing the contrast between them. In 
opposition to my claim, Thompson employs LFT to sustain his 
thesis. If the explanatory superiority of PFT over LFT holds, 
then Thompson does not accomplish an adequate connection 
between the meta- and the object-level of his exposition. 
Thompson’s thesis also reveals itself to be deficient in at least 
two argumentative factors: (1) an unfolding understanding of 
development, and (2) an insufficient operative concept of 
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emergence. Both factors are direct consequences of the form 
of thinking he embraces in his argumentation. 
As early as in the first pages of his book Mind in Life 
(2007), Thompson makes clear his expositional logic, i.e. the 
form of thinking he adopted, when he states the following: 
 
Where there is life there is mind, and mind in its most 
articulated forms belongs to life. […] The self-producing or 
“autopoietic” organization of biological life already implies 
cognition, and this incipient mind finds sentient expression 
in the self-organizing dynamics of action, perception, and 
emotion, as well as in the self-moving flow of time-
consciousness. ([1], p. ix) 
 
Here we already see that for Thompson cognition implies 
mind from the beginning. As I will show, this implication is 
based upon a fallacy, which consists in using an incongruent 
expositional tool at the meta-level with respect to the 
phenomenon in question at the object-level. To prove that 
Thompson’s line of reasoning, as employed in Mind in Life, is 
inadequate for a sound account of the human mind, I will 
show that his argumentation obeys an absolutist and 
subjectivist form of thinking. The problem is not grounded in 
absolutism or subjectivism as such. As already said, the 
inconsistency is rather based on the use of an absolutist and 
subjectivist thinking to explain a contingent and emergent 
complex phenomenon. In other words, explaining human 
subjective forms or the human mind by presupposing a 
germinal form of mind and subjectivity in basic biological 
formations seems to be—to some extent—tautological and 
circular, because the explanandum is already contained in the 
explanans in some germinal form. This kind of argumentation 
is completely normal in derivative thinking and is regarded as 
sound and valid from an absolutist and subjectivist point of 
view. Therefore, if mind is to be understood as an absolute in 
the biological stratum of all living beings, Thompson cannot 
be wrong in devolving human mind from the “sense-making” 
feature of unicellular autopoietic organisms in an unfolding 
fashion. 
In contrast to an absolutist understanding of mind, I propose 
to think of mind as an evolutionary, developmental, and, 
therefore, contingent phenomenon. I work with an 
understanding of mind that denotes a specific cognitive skill. 
That skill is a phylogenetic as well as an ontogenetic 
constructively acquired competence. As discussed by the 
German social philosopher Günter Dux, this cognitive skill 
also constructively operates in the sense of a constructive 
realism, understood as the competence of forming constructs 
like substance, causality or time. These constructs are “neither 
random nor arbitrary inventions, but the result of processing 
experience in dealing with the environment” ([4], p. 83; see 
also [2], pp. 147–151). This cognitive skill operates by means 
of thought and language in order to provide knowledge and 
insights from and into the world in which the human organism 
is embedded (cf. [4], pp. 78–94). Mind, in this sense, is not 
already delivered in the simplest autopoietic formation just as 
if were part of a general definition of life. Mind is rather the 
specific cognitive skill of a highly developed organism—in 
our case humans—, through which it acquires knowledge in 
the world and constructs, reconstructs as well as keeps on 
constructing its world in a symbolically mediated way. If 
Thompson’s understanding of mind has something—even in 
some “incipient” way—to do with this complex one, then his 
exposition necessarily points to grave argumentative 
difficulties, which I summarize here as the incipient mind 
argument. There are, in fact, indicators that suggest 
associations and connections between Thompson’s 
understanding of mind and ours. 
Although the first impression seems to be a matter of 
radically different concepts of mind, a more precise insight 
will uncover conclusive similarities, which in turn point to 
fundamental inconsistencies in Thompson’s line of reasoning. 
Thompson, in fact, ascribes notions and skills to unicellular 
organisms that are only to be found in humans or at least in 
higher nonhuman animals. In Section II, I demonstrate to what 
extent this conception of an incipient mind is consequently 
derived from our understanding of mind. Section III concisely 
outlines the two major concepts I employ as criteria in my 
criticism of Thompson’s meta-level line of reasoning, namely 
PFT and LFT. In Section IV, I describe the circular rationality 
implied in Thompson’s argumentation in accordance with LFT 
and its consequences in his understanding of development and 
emergence. In the concluding Section V, I summarize my 
criticism, showing that Thompson’s line of reasoning is 
fallacious from its meta-level outset. Subsequently, I end by 
suggesting an alternative approach to mind grounded in 
(inter)action and—what is most important—embedded in the 
rational framework of PFT. 
II. THE INCIPIENT MIND 
In Chapter six of his book Mind in Life, Thompson 
establishes his assumption of an incipient mind and 
subsequently elaborates it in chapter eight. The main 
confusion there consists in anthropologizing associations 
concerning “sentience” or “organic consciousness”. To borrow 
an illustration from Dux’ discussion of organic consciousness, 
he writes: “A toothache does not require any reflection; one 
has it when one has it” ([2], p. 78). Although the term “organic 
consciousness” can lead to misconceptions as Thompson’s 
assumptions reveal, paradoxically it is Thompson—using a 
less ambiguous term—who keeps attributing the reflective-
intentional structure of consciousness to the phenomenon he 
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calls sentience. In contrast to Thompson and in agreement 
with Dux, sentience or organic consciousness does not have 
the structure human subjectivity has (cf. [5], pp. 124–182). 
Furthermore, here we are simply discussing a somatic 
affectivity of living. It implies the coupling process of sensory 
powers and the operational closure of the living organism 
within its actual environment. This concept does not necessary 
imply any inner state or even an incipient consciousness at all. 
It is, above all, a matter of sensuous awareness. 
Again, Thompson’s rationale operates differently. He is 
willing to see more than just sensuous awareness in the 
phenomenon of sentience. Consequently, he posits a 
subjective interiority in pristine forms of life in a clearly 
extrapolative fashion with respect to human mind. The 
following quote shows this paradigmatically. 
 
This kind of in-being, that of autopoietic interiority, is not a 
matter of material boundedness. […] The interiority of life 
is the interiority of self-hood and sense-making, which is a 
precursor to the interiority of consciousness. A living being 
enacts a milieu marked by significance and valance. 
Exteriority is surmounted by an internal relation of meaning 
and normativity between the two poles of organism and 
milieu. There is thus an inwardness of life that escapes a 
purely external conception. This inwardness underlies the 
deep continuity of life and mind, and is the context in which 
the emergence of consciousness must be understood. ([1], p. 
225) 
 
From the linguistic point of view, the English term “sense-
making” is a linguistic construction derived from the locution 
“to make sense of”, which refers to the complex cognitive 
process of producing a meaning or achieving a coherence of a 
certain state of affairs. Doubtless there are highly developed 
animals, like mammals, that are able to achieve and develop 
coherence within their environment and societal milieu. 
Doubtless, we observe the behavior of unicellular organisms 
that we might describe as “intentional” or even “intelligent” in 
the absence of more suitable terms. One can observe, for 
example, how E-coli bacteria can sense where to find the 
“best” sugar.1 These behaviors, nevertheless, come about by 
 
1 For an account of interesting experiments about E-coli’s behaviors 
concerning their awareness of the environment and the concept of cellular 
memory, see [6]. This is not about “sense-making”, but about reactions to 
impulses coupled with the so-called “cellular memory”. 
Shapiro discusses memory as the maintenance of structural and reactive 
(behavioral in the sense of “logical” circuits) changes as a result of past 
interactions. Consequently, cellular memory consists in the cellular 
mechanism by which structural changes are maintained. This mechanism rests 
upon complex senso-chemical processes (e.g. sensing, transport, catalysis, 
etc.).  
In this sense, concepts like “sense-making”, “cellular memory”, 
“unicellular representations”, “intracellular recognition”, and other similar 
termini are honest attempts in understanding these highly complex dynamics 
from the point of view of the observer. Such technical terms are, nevertheless, 
means of moment-to-moment sensing. Moment-to-moment 
sensing is about life arrangement and life organization through 
non-mental interaction with the environment. Note that for 
Thompson the skill of “sense-making” implies “a kind of 
interiority”. He associates that kind of interiority with some 
mental states or a sphere that goes beyond the mere material 
distinction between internal and external spatial aspects of the 
body. 
In the following passage, Thompson gives more evidence of 
extrapolating connections between his positing of an incipient 
mind and mind as such, which do not follow from the 
biophysical facts available. 
 
A living being is not sheer exteriority (partes extra partes) 
but instead embodies a kind of interiority, that of its own 
immanent purposiveness. This interiority, as we have seen, 
comprises the self-production of an inside that specifies an 
outside to which that inside is constitutively and 
normatively related. ([1], p. 225) 
 
As one might notice, Thompson goes here so far that he even 
incurs metaphysical costs, to borrow an expression from Peter 
McLaughlin [10].2 Once again, he assumes an “inside” that 
has a specific structure. Thompson describes this structure as 
“immanent purposiveness”. This means that beyond any 
biophysical “boundedness” there—somewhere—is a sort of 
to-be-targeted-at-something or some sort of inner teleological 
attitude that the organism produces. I do not see any problem 
in observing a sort of purposiveness in the behavior of 
bacteria, insofar we are able to recognize that the assessment 
of purposiveness belongs to our judgment as observers. The 
                                                                                                        
anthropomorphic and, in consequence, misleading for an accurate 
philosophical analysis. What is happening in these cases is that the observer 
project himself onto his observations. Due to lack of conceptual procedures, 
the observer attributes mental-like powers to non-mental processes. In case of 
phrases like “information is transferred”, for instance, the use of the term 
“information” is also misleading to the point that there is even the case of a 
discourse of such processes as if they were semiotic and linguistic processes 
([7], [8], both also referred in [6], p. 10). 
To continue, cellular memory denotes the structural somatic “marks” or 
“inscriptions” the cellular interactions left behind in the cell. These 
“inscriptions” affect the behavior of the life unit (cell). One can refer to the 
association of the new behavior due to those ontogenetic marks or inscriptions 
as cellular memory. It seems unnecessary to distinguish between cellular 
memory and cellular “learning”, because of the implied change in behavior. 
Shapiro treats this topic under the rubric of “cell’s genomic memory” ([6], p. 
xvii). His suggestion is to review the genome as a RW (read-write) memory 
system (ibid.: 1, see also the concluding Chapter). He also accentuates the fact 
that intracellular sensory processes “are a key to both complementary aspects 
of genome maintenance”, namely, conservation and restructuring. 
Although Shapiro works consciously with the metaphor “engineering” and 
“invention”, he is not completely aware of his inadequate usage of the term 
“information”. In this last case, he is unaware of his encodingism. For an 
extensive criticism of encodigism in the nativist-empiricist debate, see [9]. 
2 McLaughlin introduced the term metaphysical costs in the philosophy of 
biology to designate functional explanations that bind their argumentations to 
metaphysical assumptions. Those assumptions imply in turn subjective 
presuppositions that make them, to some extent, unsound. See [10], p. 137, 
passim. I am using this expression to signal the recourse to metaphysical 
assumptions where systemic evidence and secular arguments are expected. 
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problem lies rather in ascribing that purposiveness to the 
organism as such and in locating it as structure somewhere 
“inside” but beyond the biophysical stratum of the organism. 
We know a similar structure of an “inside” produced by the 
human mind from the works of Brentano and Husserl, which 
we can trace back to the Middle Ages and even to Aristotle’s 
teleology. That is the basic structure of consciousness, namely 
intentionality. Recapitulating, we have in the quoted passage 
two essential aspects of a complex consciousness. The author 
mentions the inner or the mental sphere on the one hand, and 
intentionality or “immanent purposiveness” on the other. The 
third aspect we find in the citation above is the constitutive 
relation between the incipient mind and its environment, 
namely a sort of constructivism. The attribution of these three 
aspects as an inner (mental) sphere to unicellular organisms 
seems to be an extrapolation from human mind’s capacities. 
Therefore, if my argument is correct, we are dealing here with 
an anthropologizing modus operandi. 
By contrast, I am suggesting in this paper that there, in any 
kind of animalcules, is no such inner “sense-making” at all. As 
an adequate understanding of sensuous awareness points out, 
those creatures just live and organize themselves through—
nota bene—plain sensing and biochemical energy exchange 
like catabolism and anabolism. Although those processes are 
per se complex enough, there is nothing more to be found. 
Even in humans there is no absolute given mind at birth. 
The first signs of a subjective interiority we can clearly 
identify are observable around the seventh and ninth month of 
age [5]. In order to reach that stage of development, the infant 
has to develop not just biophysically in the sense of 
maturation, but also in terms of the interactive construction of 
the world. The constructive processes involved in the early 
ontogenesis include the construction of the inner world as an 
essential aspect for the social interaction. In this context, I 
support the thesis that the mental, that psychological 
interiority, is rather a pragmatic construct of a sufficiently 
developed cognitive skill-apparatus. Two of the indispensable 
capabilities of such a complex cognitive skill-apparatus are 
perceptual rehearsal (e.g. visuo-spatial, audio-spatial or 
phonological) in working memory and episodic memory—just 
to mention the most relevant ([11]; [12]).3 The development of 
those cognitive skills and capabilities requires a supporting 
biological stratum, for example, a sensorial complex, a central 
nerve system, and a prompting specific social milieu as in the 
case of hominids. Even though one restricts the necessary 
requirements to the minimal biophysical conditions for the 
support of a mental sphere, there must be at least a set of 
neuronal circuits capable of establishing basic patterns which 
 
3 For a discussion on episodic memory or long-term memory in general in 
infants and preschoolers, see [13]; [14]. 
in turn enable experiential rehearsal and, eventually, (mental) 
modeling rehearsal of any kind.  
Following these basic facts, it seems to have no empirical 
support ascribing a representational system or some kind of 
interiority to unicellular living beings like bacteria. An inner 
sense-making system requires a biological stratum that goes 
far beyond what unicellular living beings actually have. Such 
empirically unsustainable asseverations are not only to be 
found by Thompson, but also in the early work of Maturana 
and Verela [15] and in the discourse of the so-called 
biosemantics [16]. While Maturana and Varela attribute 
linguistic domains to animals with no language (even though 
animals can communicate perfectly), Millikan ascribes a 
representational system to bacteria. Following this line of 
thought, the manner these thinkers reflect upon the behavior of 
unicellular organisms compares with the results of a study 
conducted by Heider and Simmel in the mid-forties, where the 
majority of the test persons tended to ascribe intentions and 
even emotions to the geometric figures represented in a 
picture-film [17].4 
Thompson himself offers an example that contradicts his 
own assumptions concerning an incipient mind. He describes 
the purely physical phenomenon of the formation of the so-
called Bénard cells.5 The Bénard cells example (also known as 
the Rayleigh-Bénard convection) consists of the geometrically 
organized formation of bubbles in heated cooking oil. In this 
example, Thompson is willing to see the phenomenon of 
“emergence” of a “new self-organizing behavior”, but 
astonishingly he does not see any sense-making within the 
oil’s self-organizing properties. “Nor is there any homunculus 
or program inside the system determining those patterns” ([1], 
p. 61). Thompson has no need to posit here any kind of 
interiority. The interesting question that arises at this point is 
the following: Why then is Thompson obliged to assume an 
incipient mind in the case of autopoietic formations like 
unicellular living beings? I see the answer to this question in 
the form of thinking Thompson embraces in his 
argumentation. 
III. META-LEVEL PATTERNS OF ARGUMENTATION:                 
PFT VS. LFT 
The assumption of an incipient mind structurally follows 
from the meta-level framework Thompson employs through 
his argumentation. It is in fact a direct consequence of the 
two-sided rationality of LFT. In order to show that Thompson 
works with LFT, instead with PFT, it is necessary to briefly 
clarify what is LFT in contrast to PFT. In his book Historico-
genetic Theory of Culture (2011), Dux uncovers and 
 
4 For a recent replication of this study in Germany, see [18]. For a quick 
reference, see some versions of the film available on the Internet. 
5 For a recent study of the Rayleigh-Bénard convection, see [19]. For a quick 
reference, see some of the audiovisual materials available on the Internet. 
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extensively analyzes these two forms of thinking as distinct 
logics. Enarrativity, as already mentioned, is a constructively 
acquired disposition to reconstruct states of affairs in the field 
of objects and happenings. LFT and PFT are the two patterns 
that enarrativity, i.e. the enarrative practice, has consisted of 
throughout our history.6 Chronologically, LFT was first 
developed, and secondly PFT. I will start, however, by 
highlighting the essential characteristics of PFT and then turn 
to a summarized description of LFT. 
 
A. PFT: constructively and reflectively developed 
Historically, one can identify PFT mostly in scientific 
narrations, accounts and explanations. PFT is a symbolically 
mediated structure that develops from scientific reflections 
and engagements with the natural and social world. In this 
sense, PFT’s context of development is everything, but the 
everyday and ordinary life. Therefore, it might seem contra 
intuitive at first impression, without ceasing to be a reflective 
pragmatic construct. The basic idea of PFT is the following 
proposition at the meta-level of exposition: any phenomenon 
can only be clarified or made accountable by relationally 
subsuming it into the concatenated multivariate processes and 
multidirectional conditions from which and within it occurs. 
Taken this seriously in all its consequences, this means that 
also new, as well as singular, phenomena find their systemic 
account by means of an adequate reconstruction from its 
conditions, where (in the antecedents) the phenomena 
themselves (the consequents) are neither in any form nor by 
any means hitherto laid out. This last (genetic) aspect is the 
crucial point of PFT. With this basic description of PFT in 
mind, we can discuss now its four central characteristics:  
(1) the dynamic-systemic structure, 
(2) the potentiality of expounding novelty,  
(3) a specific epistemic contingency, and 
(4) the applicability to different types of processualities. 
 
In respect of the dynamic structure of PFT, there are two 
major aspects worthy of mention. Firstly, the dynamic consists 
of the multi-relational processuality as found in the historical 
and factual world. This means that, due to the dynamics and 
processes of our reflectively as well as empirically accessible 
universe, PFT translates and adopts a systemic structure that 
molds itself accordingly to the plurality of reference points as 
well as of levels of relations, processes and interactions in all 
relevant directions. The dynamic structure of PFT is, hence, 
polydimensional and multivariate and can contain as many 
reference points and include as many processes as necessary. 
 
6 The following discussion is based on [2], pp. 91–116. For a broader 
exposition of Dux’ structural-logical analysis of these forms of thinking and 
for a historical discussion of the emergence of PFT in relation with early 
formulations of some of its conceptual aspects by Whitehead, see also [3]. 
Thus, PFT is not confined in the two-sided structure that 
characterizes LFT. The second aspect concerning the 
dynamic-systemic structure is a direct consequence of the first. 
This structure makes obsolete any possible posit that 
proclaims an absolute validity, since any reference point, any 
process involved and any established relation is, as a structural 
consequence, always circumventable. 
The second central characteristic of PFT, namely the 
potentiality of expounding novelty, is also intrinsically related 
to its dynamic-systemic structure. It has to do with the 
structural placement of phenomena origins. In contrast to LFT, 
in PFT the necessity of identifying the beginning of a process 
with the origin of a particular phenomenon does not exist. In 
this line of thinking, one can also say, for instance, that there 
is no structural necessity of positing a form of germinal or 
incipient mind at the beginning of life or, equivalently, in the 
simplest autopoietic formation. This meta-theoretic feature of 
PFT allows for thinking novelty. With respect to some specific 
framing point of reference, the formations of new structures or 
relations never seen before make themselves accessible to the 
theoretical observer by means of PFT. While predictability is 
related to extrapolations or gradual variations of the same 
phenomenon already known, unpredictability is intrinsically 
related to novelty and the possibility of singular occurrences. 
Radically qualitative changes that take place are well 
accountable by means of PFT, without reducing them to well-
formed metaphysical principles. It is not at all surprising that 
the historical development of PFT correlates with the 
systematically removal of all kind of absolutist thinking from 
the scientific practice.7 
The specific epistemic contingency of PFT, its third 
essential characteristic, strongly relies on the concept of 
process itself. Processes are thought of as contingent and, 
therefore, causal. Even in theoretical formulations of processes 
for the modeling of mechanisms that are not empirically 
accessible, processes are still thought of as contingent and 
embedded in causal relations. In accordance with this, 
causality is correspondingly conceived—nota bene—as 
multidirectional (e.g. top-down, bottom-up, etc.). In this sense, 
the ancient aphorism “ex nihilo nihil fit”8 (nothing comes from 
nothing) upholds its validity here in a radical way. 
Finally, the fourth key characteristic of PFT is that it 
enables the connection between the pure biophysical and the 
symbolic-mediated processuality, while keeping the 
differences between them in sight. The same logic at the meta-
level, that is PFT, makes it viable to think of the universe and 
the mind in accordance with their own specific dynamics. 
While the processuality of the universe operates in terms of 
physical quantities and their fundamental units (e.g. mass and 
 
7 For a very concise historical account, see [3], pp. 45–46. 
8 This aphorism can be traced back to Lucretius and is usually attributed to 
Melissus of Samos as well as to Parmenides. 
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energy, time, length, thermodynamic temperature, etc.), 
mind’s processuality effectuates its dynamic by noetic-
symbolic means (e.g. cognitive operations, categories, thought 
and language). This connection is possible because of the 
structure of PFT and, above all, because both mind and the 
universe are simply part of the same and only one reality. 
Nevertheless, the processuality of mind continues to generate 
problems of understanding for us, so that natural scientists and 
philosophers usually tend to explain the processuality of mind 
in terms of the processuality of nature which ignores the 
means of mind as such. But getting round the mediality of 
mind signifies, in effect, avoiding the necessity of explaining 
what mind itself is. Nevertheless, understanding PFT is, then, 
an important step towards an accurate elucidation of mind’s 
dynamic complexity. PFT seems to provide a suitable 
framework to investigate the processuality of mind confined in 
the one and the same reality our universe is part of. 
 
B. LFT: ontogenetically developed and abstractly varied 
Thompson’s theoretical argumentation adheres, however, to 
LFT. Since humans give explanative accounts of states of 
affairs and of things, they have been using the logic implied in 
LFT, at least at first. In this sense, Thompson’s argument does 
not represent an exception. LFT is the oldest pattern of 
thinking in the history of culture and the initial one to arise in 
the ontogenetic development of mind. These are two strong 
reasons that explain why LFT is deeply acquainted in and 
intuitive for us, and why Thompson himself remains unaware 
of it. 
Since the ontogenetic turn, we know, however, that action 
(Handlung) molds its structure in the infant operational 
cognition during early ontogenetic development ([20]; [21], cf. 
[2], pp. 155–197; cf. [22], pp. 122–145; cf. [23], pp. 122–155). 
This is the so-called logic of action (Handlungslogik). The 
consciousness is usually unaware of this molding process due 
to its ontogenetic origins. The structure of action is very 
simple and tends to be repetitive. During the early 
ontogenesis, the caregiver is the most relevant object for the 
infant in its environment. Consequently, this object is also the 
one which decidedly imprints upon the infant. This scenario is 
the place where the translation of action occurs as a pattern of 
thinking. Yet, the most existentially important object in the 
infant’s environment is in fact a person, a subject, and most 
important, an agent of actions. The ontogenetic translation or 
molding process of the action structure in human cognitive 
development has, indeed, its own complexity. The reference to 
this evidence should be sufficient for the present discussion.9 
Starting from this development, the thinking subject perceives 
 
9 From the vast work of Jean Piaget, see, for example, [20] and [21]. For 
recent developments of Piaget’s seminal work on cognitive development, see 
[5], as well as [9]. 
and organizes the field of objects and occurrences by means of 
the action logic. Since all phenomena of experience seem to be 
caused or driven by an acting agent, we call this assimilative 
cognitive mechanism subjectivist pattern or form of thinking. 
The structure of action imprints itself as a subjectivist form of 
thinking. 
In the course of the cognitive, social, and, in general, 
cultural development of an individual, the subjectivist form of 
thinking suffers many restrictions and abstractive 
modifications. For example, the child progresses beyond the 
so-called animist stage and develops many other symbolically 
mediated skills that work parallel to cope with and within the 
world. Relevant for the present discussion is noticing that the 
core structure of the presented subjectivist form of thinking is 
not confined to infantile development or childhood. It 
develops in adult life to some abstractive variations in a 
formal fashion. From a formal perspective, the subjectivist 
form of thinking has a two-sided structure that can be grasped 
as linear, namely as LFT. 
In the cultural history of LFT, one finds a number of 
abstractive developments that can be considered as variations 
of one and the same pattern. In early mythical thought, for 
example, LFT has its expression in terms of deities and their 
will. Yet, not only gods and their will or powers were 
postulated as the (subjective) reason for occurrences and the 
existence of objects at the beginning of the enarrative 
descriptions of the world, but also the beginning itself. The 
beginning, whatever it might be, undertakes the role of the 
agent in the subjectivist, two-sided structure, whenever it is 
postulated as absolute and unconditioned. This explains why 
in the past the origin, as the absolute beginning of things and 
events, was valid as sufficient reason for accounts and 
understanding. Behind this understanding is the logic of 
action, through which the subject thinks the action before the 
action itself takes place. The explanandum is, hence, already 
thought in the origin. The origin, as the absolutely posited 
beginning, is validated as an account or an explanation.10 
Thompson follows precisely this line of reasoning when he 
affirms that “the guiding issue is to understand the emergence 
of living subjectivity from living being, where living being is 
understood as already possessed of an interiority that escapes 
the objectivist picture of nature” ([1], p. 236), letting us know 
that that interiority is, in fact, an incipient form of mind.  
 
 
10 Dux depicts extensively a number of variations in the historical 
development of PFT ([2], pp. 91–116). They go from the Greek teleology in 
metaphysics over the transcendentalism in modern philosophy and the 
absolutism of the linguistic turn up to the contemporary sociological system 
theory. For a philosophical discussion of Dux’ account, see [3]. 
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IV. CIRCULAR RATIONALITY AND ITS UNFOLDING DYNAMICS: 
FOR THE SAKE OF INTUITIVE ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Assuming that mind is already contained in life, there is 
nothing really left to be explained. All one must do is to find 
more or less good associations that support the already posited 
“explanation”. From the metaphorical and associative 
standpoint, Thompson seems to be intuitively right once his 
affirmation—that life implies mind—is likewise intuitively 
embraced, i.e. in a subjectivist thought pattern. In other words, 
one needs not an explanation of this in order to associatively 
agree with him, after his premise is accepted. Yet, making 
patent the form of thinking to which Thompson’s 
argumentation adheres, the misleading and inaccurate 
character of his account seems to be both scientifically, as well 
as philosophically, less acceptable for a systemic and secular 
understanding of the world. 
Although Thompson’s line of reasoning is vulnerable in 
many aspects, we shall not ignore its merits. Apart from John 
Searle’s hard criticism of some discourses in philosophy of 
mind, the work of Thompson and his collaborators greatly 
contributed in bringing central debates in philosophy of mind, 
in theory of knowledge, as well as in the philosophical branch 
of cognitive sciences, to a much more realistic and productive 
level. With patience and tact, he discusses and establishes a 
dialogue with famous, as well as amusing, approaches and 
debates that are in their core quite ludicrous and trivial from a 
real-constructivist point of view. The work of Thompson and 
his colleagues has impacted upon philosophy of mind and the 
cognitive sciences in a manner comparable to which Edmund 
Gettier’s famous paper [24] did in analytic epistemology.11 
Nevertheless, there is still much to be done. In his book Mind 
in Life, Thompson offers extensive biological data and 
philosophical reviews around his general thesis with the 
purpose of backing up his main asseveration, namely that 
biological nature or life implies mind. In my view, none of this 
really helps to give an accurate account of the development of 
mind out of its natural preconditions, because he is still 
dodging the question of the processuality of mind as such. 
Getting round the mind by implying it at the beginning of 
life has its argumentative consequences. The most noticeable 
consequence is that there is nothing left to account for after an 
absolutist assumption such as ‘if life, then mind’ (p → q). In 
this section I restrict my criticism to two outcomes of LFT in 
Thompson’s argumentation. As already mentioned in advance, 
these are:  
(1) an unfolding understanding of development,  and 
(2) an insufficient operative concept of emergence. 
 
11 For a very brief appreciation of Gettier’s influence in contemporary 
epistemology, see [25], pp. 3–6. 
Unfolding development and trivial emergence 
 Thompson’s supposition of an incipient mind in the 
simplest living beings is based upon a profound confusion 
about autopoietic feedback or looping-coupling processes on 
one hand, and about sentience or organic consciousness on the 
other. While he interprets the former as “selfhood” and the 
latter as the fundament of “sense-making” ([1], pp. 128–165), 
both together imply “a kind of interiority” that is not 
equivalent to the spatio-temporal dimensions of the physical 
world. In Thompson’s word: “Life realizes a kind of 
interiority, the interiority of selfhood and sense-making” ([1], 
p. 238). I agree with Thompson when he said that one should 
not understand biology in mechanical terms, yet it seems to 
me as if he were willing to re-spiritualize biology in the wrong 
context, namely in a secular understanding of the world.12 
However, what Thompson is actually suggesting is to adopt 
nearly the same conception of biological matter that Burnyeat 
defends in his interpretation of Aristotle’s De Anima [26]. 
According to Scaltas [27], Burnyeat claims in an early and 
quite different version of his revised article Is an Aristotelian 
Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (1992) that Aristotle 
principally conceives biological matter as animate, and that 
both perception and intellection are thought of as pristine 
properties of biological matter. 
 
 The general claim is that Aristotle did not conceive of 
biological matter as being inanimate, by contrast to our own 
conception of matter […]. Rather, the claim continues, for 
Aristotle, perceptual powers, as well as other mental 
powers, are primitive properties of biological matter. 
Perceptual powers [as well as mental powers] are as 
primitive as the weight or the warmth of biological matter. 
([27], p. 25) 
 
 Whether Burnyeat’s reading really fits to Aristotle’s De 
Anima is a very contentious matter among Aristotelian 
academics. On the other hand, Burnyeat’s reading seems to 
better fit to Thompson’s approach to the autopoietic 
formations. Notwithstanding the above more hermeneutical 
discussion on Aristotle,13 Thompson’s sense-making fallacy 
relies rather on the form of thinking he employs, namely LFT. 
LFT hinders Thompson from thinking of real emergence and 
development in a non-derivative way. In other words, LFT 
forces Thompson to posit an incipient mind with selfhood, 
sense-making and subjective interiority in the basis of life, 
because this two-sided rationality has explicative validity 
 
12 In this sense, Thompson enables his readers to make associations with 
metaphysical and religious worldviews. For example, one could think of a 
modern version of the Buddhist school of Vijñānavāda system, which 
proposed in its origins around the figure of Vasubandhu that all 
experienceable reality is but mind or citta. 
13 For a logico-structural analysis of Aristotle’s understanding of causation, 
see [28]. 
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within LFT’s framework. Although this form of thinking 
belongs to the metaphysical past, one finds it from time to 
time even in scientific reflections, possibly because the meta-
level of those reflections remain often unreflected. 
Thompson’s argumentation qualifies as a remarkable example. 
 To illustrate this, let us examine Thompson’s use of the 
term development. He uses it mostly in the sense of unfolding, 
i.e. a kind of unrolling of what is already there. This 
understanding of development as unfolding is also related with 
his conception of process. In Thompson’s words: “Objects 
persist and undergo change and transformation; processes 
unfold and develop in time; and events arise, endure, and 
cease” ([1], p. 317, my emphasis). Processes are therefore 
conceived and described in terms of unfolding phenomena 
through time. Regardless of Thompson’s efforts in connecting 
this concept of unfolding development with dialectic notions 
of interactions or with developmental systemic approaches, all 
these attempts remain at the metaphorical and associative 
level. They fail to give an accurate reconstruction of the 
phenomena in question, not because these approaches are 
unable to achieve an adequate explanation per se, but rather 
because they are subsumed in a logical framework that does 
not need it. For instance his concept of emergence, namely 
“dynamic co-emergence”, only serves to state two trivial 
asseverations: (1) that an organism is an organic unity not to 
be reducible into its parts or elements, and (2) that whole and 
parts are codependent. Thompson formulates this as follows: 
 
 Dynamic co-emergence best describes the sort of 
emergence we see in autonomy. In an autonomous system, 
the whole not only arises from the (organizational closure 
of) the parts, but the parts also arise from the whole. ([1], p. 
65) 
 
The problem with making trivial asseverations is not the 
triviality as such, but rather that they neither offer any new 
knowledge on the matter nor help to clarify how mind comes 
about from non-minded nature. To put it more simply, I would 
like to illustrate the scenario in the following way: It is fine to 
know that organisms are organic unities irreducible to their 
elements and that they are, to some extent, codependent in all 
scales of the system. However, one may also ask how this 
general worldview—available since the late 1930’s and early 
1940’s through Bertalanffy’s works14—can help to give a 
more concrete account that transcends the mere metaphor and 
intuition of circles, cycles, spheres or systems. 
Correspondently, there is no a single instance in Thompson’s 
argumentation where he gives an account of how mind is 
generated from the real biophysical conditions of life. That is 
 
14 Ludwig von Bertalanffy tracks his system-theoretical work back to 1937. 
See [29], p. 90. 
because Thompson does not conceive mind as a novelty in the 
world. As a consequence of this, his concept of emergence is 
merely a summative, instead of a generative one. 
 In order to solve the problem of an insufficient 
understanding of emergence in this context, we need to realize 
that mind is a systemic phenomenon that has to be grasped by 
means of a systemic logic. As a systemic phenomenon, mind 
is a real novelty in the evolution of life. Yet, within the 
framework of a two-sided form of thinking like LFT, a 
derivative thinking is considerable promoted. Due to its 
derivative character, this kind of thinking seems to be 
foredoomed to theoretical closure. As a consequence in such a 
meta-level framework, novelty turns out to be quite 
unthinkable. There only remains room for gradual 
augmentation, accidental variations and additive formations, 
but not for structurally new arrangements or novelty as such. 
In derivative thinking the explanandum must be derived, that 
is to say, extracted from its own postulation. For this reason, it 
is necessary to posit an absolute, a subjectivist beginning 
within the logical parameters of LFT. This is precisely the 
case of Thompson’s argumentation pleading in favor of a 
biological matter “that escapes the objectivist picture of 
nature” ([1], p. 236). In this context, it is evidently 
Thompson’s expectation to get the acceptance of this lax 
understanding of autopoietic basal formations within the 
academic community. The following passage plausibly 
sustains this reading: 
 
 Suppose at some point in the future, physicists felt 
compelled to include mental properties (qua mental) as 
fundamental properties of physical theory. Given that we 
cannot accurately predict the future course of physics, we 
have to at least allow for this possibility. In fact, some 
physicists and philosophers already believe such inclusion 
to be necessary to account for both mental and physical 
phenomena. But in that case, the closure of physics would 
include the mental qua mental (as opposed to the mental 
qua reduced to the physical). ([1], p. 439) 
 
The postulation of a biological stratum as already 
comprising of incipient minds appears to be critically unsound 
within the framework of PFT, which has no metaphysical 
character in the subjectivist and absolutist sense here 
explained. According to LFT, on the contrary, it is completely 
natural and valid to argue in this way. A germinal form of 
mind is posited at the beginning of the exposition in order to 
let it unfold up to a richer form, i.e. to the human mind, at the 
end of the argumentation. Thompson pursues nothing more, 
nothing less than that. Hence, it is in this fashion that the 
human mind develops, unfolds, and emerges after Thompson’s 
account of it. This explains also why he does not see at all the 
necessity of giving an account of a real, i.e. generative, 
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emergence of mind. After LFT, there simply does not exist 
such a problem to be formulated at all. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
At the beginning of the present paper, in Section II, I 
showed that Thompson’s understanding of mind, formulated 
as “incipient mind”, is not a radically different concept of 
mind as the operative concept I sketched in the introductory 
Section I. In Section II, I identified and described the 
conclusive similarities Thompson’s concept of an incipient 
mind shares with the notion of mind as a symbolically 
mediated cognitive skill. These convergent aspects are the 
inner sphere of the mental and the intentionality or, as 
Thompson calls it, the “immanent purposiveness”. Connecting 
to this analysis, I demonstrated that the assumptions 
Thompson makes in his concept of an incipient mind and the 
corresponding mental attributions to unicellular organisms do 
not follow from any basic biological facts (object-level). 
From these opening arguments arose the question of why 
then Thompson, despite these basic empirical facts, fell into 
the incipient mind fallacy. After briefly describing and 
contrasting the two forms which can be postulated for the 
enarrative practice in the broader context of Section III, I 
made clear that Thompson’s argumentation is de facto 
subordinated to LFT. This was the first step in answering our 
question. 
Besides the purpose of briefly introducing the concepts of 
PFT and LFT, the description of PFT in Part A of Section III 
was also intended to make clear that its central characteristics, 
namely its dynamic-systemic structure, the potentiality of 
expounding novelty, its specific epistemic contingency, and its 
applicability to different types of processualities qualify PFT 
as the most suitable enarrative structure in term of which mind 
can find a sound explanation. Conversely, LFT showed itself 
as an inappropriate meta-level framework of exposition. 
Accordingly, LFT and mind are in their theoretical and 
empirical character completely incompatible. 
In Part B of Section III, I concisely described how LFT 
comes about in early ontogenesis and why it has the two-sided 
structure it has. I also explained why LFT can properly be 
grasped as a subjectivist and an absolutist, as well as a linear, 
thinking pattern. In connection with these characteristics, I 
discussed in Section IV how the linear structure of LFT can 
also be shaped circularly. Comparing LFT’s structure with 
Thompson’s argumentative exposition, I demonstrated that he 
works de facto within the framework of LFT at the meta-level. 
As a result of this modus operandi, he develops an unfolding 
understanding of development and an insufficient operative 
concept of emergence. Thereby, we have seen why these two 
working concepts do not really work for a sound explanation 
of human mind. While the first remains confined in the two-
sided and derivative structure of LFT, the second shows itself 
unable to give an accurate account of novelty per se. 
Altogether, we have seen that Thompson structurally works 
with LFT, although the language he uses in his argumentation 
belongs, to some extent, to the enarrative praxis of PFT. In 
uncovering these differences, I have suggested that, from a 
processual vantage point, Thompson’s assumption of an 
incipient mind is based on the fallacy of presupposing it from 
the beginning of the argumentation in a subtle and absolutist 
fashion.  
After revealing the structural unsoundness of Thompson’s 
incipient mind argument, I now suggest an alternative to the 
enterprise of explaining how mind generates and develops. 
The first prerequisite in order to give a developmental account 
of mind is a deep understanding of how it works at all. As 
already anticipated in the introductory section, mind is a 
complex of skills that operates constructively by means of 
thought and language. It is in constantly development since 
the birth of the individual and at the same time in relation with 
the historical development of social worlds. In this line of 
thought, the mental must be understood as a pragmatic 
construct of a developing mind that is to come to terms with 
the world. The construct of the mental is one of a multiple 
spectrum of constructs that are necessary in order to efficiently 
live in the changing natural and social world already found by 
the individual. In the case of humans, the mental is therefore a 
construct built by means of thought and language. 
In order to tackle the task of a systemic understanding of 
human mind, we must focus on its mediality, as well as on its 
symbolically mediated processuality. How the operationality 
of thinking develops from the interactions with and within the 
world and how categories are built by an individual 
(organism) in order to find an orientation and a possibility of 
(re)organization in a cultural milieu, are the guiding questions 
for a fruitful beginning of research. This research is to be 
based upon action-based theories, as well as upon real-
constructivist approaches.15 Based on the real biophysical 
conditions, the great research challenge actually lies on the 
transition of the cognitive means: from high developed 
moment-to-moment sensing to thought and language. An 
accurate account of such a complex and concatenated 
phenomenon like mind has to be conceived in terms of PFT at 
the meta-level of exposition, if there is the intention of 
explanatory success and factual adequacy at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Unfortunately, a number of great action-based efforts have been 
systematically attacked during the last forty years (cf. [9]). 
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